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U.S. District Court Rules!
Governor Free to set Election date.
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The ruling by the Honorable Judge Wooten of the US District Court for the District of South Carolina – Florence Division, the final conclusion reads as follows:
The defendants South Carolina Democratic Party and the Executive Committee of the South Carolina Democratic Party motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Similarly, all of the remaining defendants are DISMISSED as parties of the instant action. All remaining and pending motions are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Terry L. Wooten
United States District Court Judge
September 3, 2004
Analysis
I. Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction:
The defendants (Democrat Party) asserted that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the Court of jurisdiction in this case. However, the judge did not agree. While he felt that the legal position of the defendants deserved consideration, he declined to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
It was argued that, since Glover had brought this action before the Supreme Court of South Carolina and lost, the US District Court did not have jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in which an action that has been lost in the state court system cannot be renewed in the federal court system. Judge Wooten pointed out that although this may have applied to Glover, it did not apply to those other plaintiffs that joined Glover in this case.
Thus he concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar him from exercising jurisdiction in this case.
II. Alleged Violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
The Voting Rights Act prohibits a State or its political subdivisions from imposing any voting practice “in a manner which results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color.”
The judge found that there was no showing by the plaintiffs that they or others would be denied the right to vote on account of their race and/or color in a new election.
III. Alleged Violations of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In particular, the Democratic Executive Committee’s 1) decision finding Norwood’s Protest timely; 2) decision to hold a hearing on Norwood’s protest on June 17th, 2004; 3) failure to strictly comply with the state statutory notice requirements, violated the Voting Rights Act.
The Voting Rights Act requires that any change in a voting “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” must first undergo administrative preclearance from the Attorney General or judicial preclearance from the District Court. To obtain judicial preclearance, the change must not “have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the rights to vote on account of race or color.”
Based on the testimony, although certain procedures were not followed to the letter of the law, it was clear that Glover was represented by legal counsel and that none of the issues laid out in testimony were racially motivated. In the words of Mr. Joe Erwin, the Democratic Party Chairman, the decisions made were made in a desire to “move quickly” in the interest of the residents of District 30. In addition, according to Mr. Erwin, had the issue of either insufficient notice and/or insufficient service been raised at the June 17th, 2004 Norwood protest hearing, the hearing would have been delayed. However, no such objection was ever raised by Glover’s attorney.
This court concluded that although certain specifics of the procedural requirements under state law were not followed, such deviations do not give rise to a claim pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and found summary judgment appropriate in favor of the defendants.
IV. Plaintiff’s Request for the Convening of a Three Judge Panel:
Since the alleged procedural deficiencies were found not to be the types of claims that fall within the bounds of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Judge concluded that the convening of a three-judge panel was not required and the plaintiff’s request for such a panel was denied.
V. Alleged Violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to the US Constitution:
The plaintiffs argued that since Senator Glover was not personally served with either a copy of the candidate Norwood’s election protest and/or a notice of the Norwood protest hearing itself, their constitutional rights had been violated. Moreover, plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Rights Protection Clause was violated because voters would not have the opportunity to vote.
Summary judgment in favor of the defendants is appropriate on the basis that no person’s fundamental right to vote for the candidate of their choice will be denied.
Furthermore summary judgment in favor of the defendants is appropriate on the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the Due Process Clause. As the record reflects, Attorney Gray participated in the June 17th hearing addressing Norwood’s election protest before the Executive Committee. Attorney Gray was afforded the opportunity to present opening and closing statements, cross-examine witnesses, and introduce evidence on behalf of Senator Glover. At no time, did any party or representative, including Attorney Gray, object to the issues of either insufficient notice or insufficient service. Attorney Gray did not request that the hearing be continued until a later date.
VI. Alleged Violations of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the US Constitution:
Plaintiffs alleged that the decision to void the election diluted the voting strength of the African American community. There was no evidence to support this claim, nor was there any evidence that the decision to void the election was racially motivated. As the record indicates, the decision of the Executive Committee to void the election was based upon widespread voter fraud, not racial animus.
Summary judgment was awarded in favor of the defendants.
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